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This article attempss an analysis of Canadian environmental diplomacy during the recent « turbot war ». The dispute included the Canadian arrest of a Spanish fishing vesse,, the Estai, beyond the 200 mile zone. Turbot, also known as Greenland halibu,, is considered a straddiing fish stock because it is present both within and adjacent to the 200 mile zone. The Canadian response to the straddiing stock issue involved a two-track strategy of unilateral action and multilateral negotiation. Canadian multilateral efforts included participation in the United Nations Conferenee on Straddiing Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stock.. This paper examines the underlying causes of the straddiing stocks issue as well as the rights and obligaiions of coastal and high seas fishing ssates.
Le présent article examine la condutte de 1. Introduction
Introduction
The « turbot war» was about more than turbot. Turbot was the straw that broke the camel's back .
J. Alan BEESLEY and Malcolm ROWE George Saville once observed, « [tjhere is more learning required to explain a law than went into the making of it 2 . » The making of the law that allowed Canadian fisheries officers to board and arrest foreign fishing vessels on the high seas was less onerous than the subsequent explanations required after the Spanish fishing vessel Estai was arrested on the high seas by Canadian fisheries officers 3 . The task of justifying the Canadian enforcement action was made more burdensome because of its illegality under international law 4 . The counter-argument was that the Spanish vessel was not respecting its legal obligations under international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
If there is a framework of analysis to the international law questions involved in the events surrounding the arrest of Estai, also known as the « turbot war », it is within legal institutions such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 5 and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). The failure of these two institutions to address the problem of fisheries management of straddling fish stocks resulted in Canadian efforts to establish the United Nations Conference on SOR 94-362, SOR 95-136. The Estai was arrested on the high seas on March 9, 1995. 4. According to the United Naiions Conveniion on the Law of the Sea, specifically Articles 87 and 92 ( 1 )) vessels on the high seas not only benefit from the freedom of the high seas, they are subject only to the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag state while on the high seas (subject to conditions).
The 1982 United Naiions Conveniion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) came into force
in November 1994 after 60 countries consented to ratification. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention's provisions relating to the fisheries can be considered a codification of customary law The International Court of Justice in Libya v. Malta, [1985] I.C.J. 13, 33 (June 3,1985) , found the 200 mile exclusive economic zone to be customary international law.
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and the abovementioned unilateral enforcement action against the Spanish fishing vessel.
On May 10, 1994, Canada amended its domestic fishing regulations, the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act, to enable Canadian fisheries officials to board and arrest any non-NAFO member fishing vessel 6 . In March, 1995, the legislation was again amended to include NAFO members, Spain and Portugal, after a dispute over turbot allocations. The dispute erupted after a major reduction in the turbot quota allocated to the European Union (EU) which represents Spain and Portugal as well as other EU members within the NAFO organization.
Canada had a two-track strategy to deal with EU and non-NAFO member overfishing practices vis-à-vis the straddling stocks problem. The first strategy was multilateral : it consisted of the so-called « legal initiative » with the objective of multilateral negotiations. The second strategy was unilateral : it resulted in the enactment of domestic legislation to allow unilateral enforcement action against non-NAFO member vessels and subsequently Spanish and Portuguese vessels.
The « legal initiative » consisted of a concerted effort to build a coalition among Law of the Sea experts as well as like-minded countries to lobby for changes which would address the straddling fish stock problem. The breakthrough in this diplomatic effort occurred during the June 1992 Rio Summit, also known as the Earth Summit, where a resolution was passed to establish a conference which ultimately became known as the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.
The Canadian strategy was influenced by the domestic fisheries situation as well as the global fisheries crisis. In March 1995, the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) released a report entitled The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture which declared that at the beginning of the 1990s about 69 per cent of the world's conventional species were fully exploited, overexploited, depleted or in the process of rebuilding as a result of depletion 7 . The straddling stocks issue is a fisheries management problem 6. Non-NAFO member vessels include vessels from non-NAFO member states, stateless vessels, and « flags of convenience vessels ». « Flags of convenience » vessels are considered vessels that are registered under a nationality different than the true nationality of the vessel, for example, a Spanish vessel registers under the flag of Panama to avoid NAFO member regulations. for a number of countries such as Canada where the continental shelf extends beyond the EEZ 8 .
The straddling groundfish stocks managed by NAFO in the Northwest Atlantic, especially cod and flounder, were in a state of collapse. In 1987, the spawning stock biomass for 3NO cod was estimated to be 200,000 tonnes. The most dramatic is 2J3KL cod, where the spawning stock biomass has declined by about 90 per cent in the past two years 9 . It is understandable that with the collapse of the Atlantic groundfish fishing industry that there was considerable domestic pressure on the Canadian government for action to combat overfishing of straddling stocks by Spanish and Portuguese fishing vessels. This paper will examine the Canadian strategy and action in an international law context. First, the paper will summarize the weaknesses of the existing legal regimes, UNCLOS and NAFO, which propelled the Canadian government into taking both unilateral and multilateral action. UNCLOS requires that coastal states and high seas fishing states cooperate within regional fisheries organizations such as NAFO. Unfortunately, NAFO lacks effective enforcement powers and a compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. These weaknesses are compounded by an objection procedure which allows any NAFO member to object and not be bound by NAFO resolutions regarding issues such as fish allocations.
Second, it is useful to examine the coastal state's rights and high seas fishing state's obligations vis-à-vis the conservation of straddling fish stocks under the UNCLOS regime. The provisions of Articles 63 (2) and 116 are examined because some observers believe these articles justify unilateral coastal state measures. These provisions, however, include specific limitations with regard to allocation and enforcement issues.
Third, the events that led to the ultimate arrest of the Estai are summarized because they reveal key elements necessary for the examination of the Fifth, Canada's role will be examined in its multilateral efforts in the establishment and ultimate success of the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Finally, this paper assesses the success of the Canadian two-track strategy.
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 10
The major accomplishment of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding fisheries management was the establishment of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Article 56 gives the coastal state sovereign rights within the EEZ for the purposes of exploring, exploiting, conserving, and managing living resources of the seabed, subsoil, and superadjacent waters.
Article 61 allows the coastal state to determine the allowable catch of living resources within the EEZ and to ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the living resources are not endangered. Furthermore, Article 61, requires that the coastal state and competent international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, shall cooperate to this end.
Straddling stocks, such as turbot (also known as Greenland halibut), migrate beyond the 200-mile zone into international waters 1 '. Articles 63 (2) and 118 require the establishment of regional fisheries organizations to manage the straddling stocks between the interests of coastal states and distant water fishing states. Under Article 118, states shall cooperate to create subregional or regional fisheries organization to conserve and manage high seas resources. Article 63 (2) addresses the issue of management of straddling stocks through regional organizations : . The EU's defense of its unilaterally set quotas is based on NAFO's objection procedure under Article XII of the NAFO Convention. The objection procedure allows any NAFO member to object and not be bound by NAFO resolutions regarding issues such as fish allocations.
Canada contended that this overfishing was not only a breach of the UNCLOS but also the NAFO convention. Spain was accused of not only overfishing but also using destructive fishing practices such as the use of small mesh gear to catch immature fish stocks 18 . The objection procedure and the lack of a compulsory dispute settlement procedure were two major weaknesses of NAFO 19 . Furthermore, NAFO has no real mandate to enforce conservation measures.
During the 1988 NAFO annual meeting a resolution was passed that member countries avoid excessive use of the objection procedures. One option was to amend Article XII which would limit permissible objections. Unfortunately, in order to pass such an amendment, it would have to be supported by all member countries 20 Interestingly, Applebaum also suggests that Article 63 gives the coastal state a «non-limiting effect» regarding the obligation to participate in a process of seeking to agree on measures outside its limits. This obligation is based on Article 61 which requires the coastal state to ensure the maintenance of the resources within its zone. It is Applebaum's application of the « non-limiting effect » which could be considered controversial insofar that he suggests that coastal states « have the right to take other steps » which seems to suggest unilateral action if there is no agreement on conservation measures : [...] however the coastal state's obligation to « seek to agree » in no way limits the rights of the coastal state that flow from its duty to ensure the maintenance of the resources within its zone [...} In other words, having sought to agree, and failed, the coastal state has the duty and the right to take other steps 27 .
Articles 116 to 119 : Superior Rights of Coastal States
Article 117 is related to the question of the obligation to conclude a fisheries management agreement because it requires all States to take or cooperate in taking « such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. » Article 118 requires states exploiting living resources in the same area of the high seas to « enter into negotiations with a view to taking measures necessary for the conservation of living resources concerned. » Article 119, entitled «Conservation of the living resources of the high seas», includes several paragraphs that outline the possible factors to be considered in 25 Furthermore, Miles and Burke argue the coastal state could demand that these states comply, and if refused, seek a remedy through compulsory dispute settlement mechanism 31 . Canada has not yet become a party to UNCLOS, and therefore, it is not bound by the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. If Canada decided to ratify UNCLOS, the amendments to the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act would be in conflict with the Convention's Articles on high seas fishing. Moreover, the non-parties to the Convention, would not be bound to adhere to the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism. The perceived difficulty with the 1958 Convention is related to the argument that the Convention was intended to apply to fish stocks adjacent to the territorial seas (12 miles) and not the EEZ (200 miles). The counterargument is that the 1958 Convention does not place an outer limit on the distance of adjacent fish stocks subject to coastal state preference 33 . Miles and Burke consider the extension of coastal state preference beyond the EEZ in a retrospective manner : « the 1958 provisions potentially concerned a far larger problem than coastal states now face, since fishing areas adjacent to 200-mile EEZs are a lot less significant than those outside a 12-mile exclusive zone 34 ». A second issue concerns allocation measures unilaterally taken by the coastal state beyond the 200-mile zone. As mentioned in the preceding pages, the coastal state has no authority to prescribe regulations regarding fish stock allocations on the high seas. The 1982 Convention, UNCLOS, is silent on allocation criteria, and therefore, the coastal states would have to rely on customary law where there is no consensus on the subject 37 .
In conclusion, the reason why there was no Canadian attempt at any form of « dispute settlement » via UNCLOS 38 or the 1958 Convention was that the measures used to accomplish two major objectives in the turbot dispute, unilateral enforcement measures and regulation of allocations beyond the EEZ, would be considered not within the rights of the coastal state. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that many of these arguments were based upon unsettled legal concepts and would involve the high risk of a negative decision. p. 120, outlines the obligations under UNCLOS Article 287 which requires that states make a written declaration accepting that disputes may be refered to one or more tribunals: «Where both parties to a dispute have accepted the same procedure that procedure is to be used, unless otherwise agreed. Where, however, they have accepted different procedures (or one party has not accepted any procedure), then the dispute may be refered to arbitration. The amendment was originally targeted against non-NAFO members which fished in the NAFO Regulatory Area, however, the EU correctly reasoned that the amendment could add the names of NAFO Contracting Party countries that Canada could consider unilaterally not to be fishing according to Canadian conservation requirements.
NAFO : A Place to Debate

A New Approach in NAFO
NAFO is not, I sugges,, the place to debate questions of internaiionll law, though I can assure you that
During the 1994 NAFO annual meeting, September 19-23, in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia, there were controversial presentations delivered by both the Canadian and EU representatives in response to the recent Canadian legislation. The Canadian representative began his presentation with an overview of the fishing crisis and the measures taken by the Canadian government. He admitted that there was a profound resource crisis in straddling stocks and that the problem was further exasperated by ecological factors such as water temperatures, salinity, and predator-prey relationships.
Canada had instituted a moratoria for cod and flounder stocks and decided that Greenland halibut (turbot) had become a threatened resource. In response, Canada reduced its domestic quotas for the NAFO zone 2+3 G. Greenland halibut from 25,000 tonnes to 6,500 tonnes (a 75 per cent reduction). These measures, however, related only to waters under Canada's national jurisdiction.
Regarding international waters and the NAFO Regulatory Area, the Canadian representative argued that the conservation measures taken there must match those measures taken in waters under Canadian jurisdiction. The Canadian Deputy Minister of Fisheries continued to outline the difficulty in eliminating illegal fishing activities by vessels reflagged by countries such as Panama and Honduras : a joint NAFO demarche, with a deadline of April 1994, was made to these countries, however, the vessels remained. Despite indications of cooperation from these countries, the problem continued because the local fines had been small and ineffective 44 .
The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was formulated upon instructions from
FAO. It is to be consistent with the 1982 UNCLOS and to have as its purpose the concept of « responsible fisheries » i.e. the sustainable utilization of fishery resources. The code consists of five introductory articles : Nature and scope ; Objectives ; Relationship with other international instruments ; Implementation, monitoring and updating ; and Application of the code to developing states. The introductory articles are followed by seven articles : general principles, fisheries management, fishing operations, aquaculture development, integration of fisheries into coastal area management, post harvest practices and trade and fisheries research. The completed code was scheduled to be presented a He also observed that while these illegal activities were taking place NAFO members were respecting moratoria on most straddling stocks especially Canada who closed the fishery for virtually all the stocks concerned. Furthermore, he added, since the amendment of the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and its coming into force on May 30, 1994, fishing of straddling stocks by flag of convenience and stateless vessels has stopped 46 .
Turbot was also on the menu ' NAFO establlshed a Total Allowable Catch (TAC), for the first time ever, for Greenland halibut at 27,000 tonnes for 1995 in response to advice from NAFO's Scientific Council. This conclusion was reached after the Canadian representative had outlined 3 options for Greenland Halibut in the 2+3 zone : The Canadian representative concluded his summary of the options by stating that 15,000 tonnes was Canada's preference. It should be noted that Canada had already reduced its own 1994 quota for 2+3 Greenland halibut from 25,000 to 6,500 tonnes (75 per cent reduction) 48 . The response from the EU representative was that he interpreted the Scientific Council's advice as recommending that the fishing effort be reduced so as not to exceed a harvest of 40,000 tonnes. The Canadian representative responded that the Scientific Council was not recommending a TAC of 40,000 tonnes rather that 45 current fishing levels (1994) were estimated to catch 40,000 tonnes and there was a need for a significant cut in this effort 49 . As a result of this divergence of interpretation, the EU proposed a TAC of 40,000 tonnes which was not supported by the other N AFO Contracting Parties. The representative of Norway proposed a compromise of a TAC of 27,000 tonnes. This proposal was adopted by the other NAFO members, however, the EU abstained 50 .
On February 1, 1995, at a special meeting in Brussels, Belgium, NAFO decided on the allocations of the 27,000 tonnes TAC for Greenland halibut for 1995. There were three proposals, Canadian, European, and Cuban. A vote was suggested on the Cuban proposal which allocated 3,400 tonnes (12.59 per cent) to the EU and 16,300 tonnes (60.37 per cent) to Canada. The proposed EU allocation represented only 12 per cent of the EU 1994 turbot catches.
The EU feared the outcome of a vote and suggested to the Chairman to take the exceptional measure of having a vote on whether to vote on the allocation. The Chairman concluded that the majority favoured a vote. A narrow vote, 6 to 5 with two abstentions, decided the controversial allocations which gave Canada 60.37 per cent and the EU 12.59 per cent of the 1995 quota 51 .
On February 5, 1995, Canadian Fisheries Minister Tobin wrote to the EU Fisheries Commissioner Emma Bonino indicating that Canada was prepared to consider « transitional measures » to allow the EU to adjust to the 1995 quota on the understanding the EU would not invoke the NAFO objection procedure 52 . The EU objected to the term «transitional measures » because it was considered the equivalent of a tacit acceptance of the Brussels allocations, and therefore, could be used a precedent for future allocations. The Canadian response proved inflexible regarding a change of terminology 53 . 49 Canada and Spain came within hours of a naval gunboat confrontation before the EU ambassadors decided to ratify the bilateral fishing agreement with Canada. The threat of the naval gunboats and last-minute Canadian concessions are considered to have influenced a diplomatic settlement of the dispute. Canada agreed not to pursue a legal case against the captain of the Estai who had been accused of overfishing. The EU reserved the right to request a larger allocation of turbot the next year when the quotas are negotiated by NAFO. Furthermore, Spain and Portugal were allowed an additional 5,000 tonnes of turbot in 1995 as a «last-minute deal sweetener 60 ».
Canadian officials were criticized because the Agreement «turns a blind eye » to large amounts of turbot that had already been caught. During the last few days of negotiations, Mr. Tobin had reduced previous Canadian estimates of turbot caught to date by the Spanish to between 4,000 to 7,000 tonnes 61 .
Canadian officials in their original negotiations in Brussels had claimed an additional 5,000 tonnes had been caught to date. EU officials, however, argued that the original Canadian estimates were too high. If the original Canadian estimates had been used in the Agreement, the Spanish government would have been obliged to order its vessels to immediately cease fishing in the NAFO Regulatory Area because they would have caught their allocation 62 .
The EU increased their share of the 1995 turbot allocation from 3,400 tonnes (12.59 per cent) to 10,000 tonnes (37 per cent) of 27,000 tonnes of the total allowable catch. Canada reduced its original 1995 quota from 16,300 tonnes (60.37 per cent) to 10,000 tonnes (37 per cent). Russia and Japan retained their 1995 quotas respectively at 3,200 tonnes (11.85 percent) and 2,600 tonnes (9.63 per cent). The quota for « other» members remained at 1,500 tonnes (5.56 per cent).
The Agreement also was significant because it proposed the division of the zone, which contained straddling turbot stock, into two parts. It was later approved, that the 1995 Canadian turbot allocation of 10,000 tonnes was divided into two zones : a new northern zone which is entirely within Canadian waters (2+3K) and a southern zone (3LMNO) which includes the nose and tail of the Grand Banks and the Flemish cap beyond the 200-milelimit 63 .
Therefore, Canada received a 1995 turbot allocation for the northern zone of 7,000 tonnes and 3,000 tonnes for the southern zone. Only Canada can receive allocations from the northern zone even though it is included in the calculation for the total allowable catch of turbot.
The Bilateral Agreement also proposed the 1996 total allowable catch at 27,000 tonnes 64 . Robert Rochon, Director-General of Foreign Affairs' Legal Bureau, and William Rowat, Deputy Minister of Fisheries (Canada), were engaged in shuttle diplomacy to Moscow and Tokyo to persuade Russia and Japan to reduce by 20 per cent their turbot allocations for 1996 in order to meet the EU's demand for an increase 65 . The EU increased their allocation from 10,000 tonnes to 11,070 tonnes. The EU emphasized they needed to increase their share from 50 per cent to 55.35 per cent of the 20,000 tonnes available in the southern zone (3LMNO) 66 .
The Agreement included a new measures to ensure compliance with NAFO measures : such as observers required aboard all fishing vessels 62. ibid. 63. Adopted at the NAFO Special Meeting, June 7-9, 1995 in Toronto. 64. NAFO's allocation key for 1996 and thereafter for Greenland halibut in 3LMNO will be in the ratio of 10:3 for the EU and Canada (aside from allocations to other Contracting Parties (100 per cent coverage), a satellite tracking system (35 per cent coverage), dockside inspections of all vessels at each port of call, special powers to order a vessel to port for inspection, and authority to seal fish holds in order to preserve evidence.
There were a few conservation measures which remained outstanding such as a minimum fish size to protect juvenile Greenland halibut which was later set at 30 cm during the NAFO Annual Meeting in September, 1995 67 . This should be considered inadequate protection of the turbot's ability to reproduce : a turbot's reproductive maturity is at three years and it should measure 60 to 65 cm.
The Bilateral Agreement proposed to discuss the controversial mesh size of 120 millimetres, which was aboard the Estai when it was arrested. NAFO later established the minimum mesh size at 130 mm for all groundfish and flatfish during NAFO's annual meeting in September, 1995 68 . At the NAFO annual meeting in September, 1995, the measures outlined in the Bilateral EU-Canada Agreement were extended to apply to all NAFO members. There remains two unresolved issues : compulsory dispute settlement and the NAFO objection procedure. Earl Wiseman, Acting Director-General of International Directorate of the Canadian Fisheries Department, hopes to soon pursue the subject of compulsory dispute settlement on a bilateral basis. Presently, there are no plans to resolve the objection procedure problem 69 . Daniel Webster's celebrated dictum that the right of self-defence may extend to such incursions when « the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation 70 . » One of the legal justifications for the incursion is the concept of necessity which is often confused in doctrine and in practice with right of self-defense. This distinction was outlined in a memorandum, dated April 19,1994, on the doctrine of necessity prepared by the Legal Bureau of Foreign Affairs (Canada) :
The Legality of the Estai Arrest
Unlike self-defence and counter-measures, which also preclude wrongdoing, the operation of the doctrine of necessity does not presuppose the existence of a wrongful act committed by another State whose right is infringed by the State acting out necessity. In circumstances of necessity, the other State may be innocent or The recent Canadian action on the high seas is certainly not the first time that necessity was invoked to justify conservation measures. In 1893, the Russian Imperial Government had been concerned regarding the in- crease in sealing activities by British and American fishermen near Russian territorial waters. To avert the danger of extermination of the seals, and despite the fact that the seal hunt took place outside Russian territorial waters, the Russian government issued a decree that prohibited the seal hunt in an area that formed part of the high seas.
The Russian government justified its actions because of « absolute necessity » in view of the imminent opening of hunting season. The government had emphasized the provisional nature of the measure and it proposed the negotiation of an agreement as a permanent solution to the problem. Robert Ago, in his presentation on the subject of necessity to the International Law Commission concluded that the Seal fisheries off the Russian Coast was a useful example because it not only illustrates the concept of necessity but introduces the strict conditions necessity required if invoked 75 . The defence of necessity is subject to seven conditions as enumerated by Yves Le Bouthillier :
1. An essential interest of the state has to be in peril. 2. The peril must be grave and imminent. 3. The action taken by the state is the only one that could safeguard its essential interest. 4. The action has not gravely prejudiced the interests of the state against which the action was directed. 5. The action is temporary in nature. 6. The action taken is limited to what is strictly necessary to face the peril. 7. The state relying on necessity has not contributed to that necessity 76 .
These seven conditions, based on Robert Ago's presentation to the International Law Commission, have also been summarized by Alan Beesley and Malcolm Rowe in their defence of the Canadian action which essentially repeats the Yves Le Bouthillier's enumeration 77 .
Beesley and Rowe also argued that Canada's action can be justified under the doctrine of retorsion, as defined by Kelsen (1959) Edward Miles and William Burke were precise that retorsion measures did not include physical force: «Nothing in the 1982 treaty or in other customary law, however, authorizes one high seas fishing state to take action on the high seas to enforce a conservation obligation owed to it by another state 80 . » Nevertheless, Miles and Burke concluded there were other recourses available : diplomatic action (protests), domestic remedies (refusal of port access), and international trade sanctions 81 .
Retorsion was one of the four policy options suggested by Bob Applebaum. The Canadian government has employed diplomatic action (protests) and refusal of port access against EU and non-NAFO members fishing the NAFO Regulatory Area 82 .
The three other options Applebaum suggested were : reprisals in conformity with international law 83 , dispute settlement 84 , and incorporation of provisions related to the coastal state's preferential rights over straddling stocks 85 .
Applebaum's starting point for the third option, regarding the incorporation of provisions related to the coastal state's preferential rights over straddling stocks, involves an interpretation of options outlined by Miles and Burke. They concluded that according to UNCLOS, coastal states can 79 prescribe measures for states fishing straddling stocks and demand that these states observe these measures and if refused, seek remedy through a compulsory dispute mechanism 86 .
Applebaum extrapolates beyond Miles and Burke's conclusion which results in dispute settlement with the suggestion that the coastal state is to incorporate in its domestic legislation provisions relating to its preferential rights over straddling stocks outside its 200 mile limit :
Such incorporation could provide for regulations applicable outside its 200 miles limit and for enforcement of these regulations outside 200 miles in, for example, cases where there are bilateral or multilateral agreements providing for such enforcement 87 .
It should be considered it a leap in logic to go from dispute settlement suggested by Miles and Burke to unilateral enforcement measures against stateless vessels fishing on the high seas. It is an even greater extension of legal reasoning to consider these actions against other contracting parties of an international fishery organization such as NAFO.
Some jurists may consider it legally justifiable to arrest so-called stateless vessels because they are not registered under a « flag state » as « required » by UNCLOS Article 92 (1) : « Ships shall sail under the flag of State only ». This is an incorrect interpretation, according to the Legal Bureau of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs which concluded the legislative history of Article 92 (1) does not indicate that the drafters of that provision and its precursors considered statelessness in and of itself to be contrary to international law 88 .
Stateless vessels, therefore, should not be considered illegal under international law. This consideration, however, does not prevent any state from applying its domestic law to stateless vessels. Ted McDorman summarized the elements of this legal argument and emphasized there were limitations :
Regarding a stateless vessel, prima facie, because a stateless vessel is not the territory of any State, there is no extraterritorial application of law. Since a State can prescribe and enforce laws against its own vessels on the high seas, it can also prescribe and enforce these laws against stateless vessels. But this is not to say that Professor Francis Rigaldies, a member of the Law Faculty of Université de Montréal, considers the recent amendment to the Canadian Coastal Fisheries Act as a unjustified use of the concept of stateless persons (apatride) in order to enforce fishing violations against stateless vessels : La Loi canadienne de 1994, qui autorise expressément la saisie et l'emploi de la force à rencontre du navire apatride, ne saurait donc être justifiée, même si son objectif était de lutter contre les navires sans nationalité. A contrario, le Canada n'est pas justifié à utiliser les règles du droit international relatives à apatride pour sanctionner les violations à ses règlements de pêche 90 .
Rigaldies' reasoning relates to UNCLOS Article 110 which allows a ship to be boarded if there is reasonable grounds to believe the ship is without nationality (stateless). Article 92.2 considers vessels which sail under flags of convenience to be without nationality, and therefore, may also be boarded. Despite these powers to board and even to arrest, Rigaldies contends there is no power to seize or confiscate the vessel nor to take sanctions against the captain and crew 91 .
Rigaldies also believes there is difficulty in establishing that a vessel is stateless. « If therefore, a guilty act committed on the high seas produces its effects on a vessel flying another flag or in a foreign territory, the same principles must be applied as if the territories of two different States were concerned, and the conclusion must therefore be drawn that there is no rule of international law prohibiting the State to which the ship on which the effects of the offence have taken place belongs, from regarding the offence as having been committed in its territory and prosecuting accordingly, the delinquent. This conclusion could only be overcome if it were shown that there was rule of customary international law which, going further than the principle stated above established the exclusive jurisdiction of the State whose flag was flown » In 1927 the French goverment was unable to prove to the court the existence of such a rule of cu'stomary international law 92. Id., 265-266. The Compliance Agreement requires contracting parties to ensure that vessels flying their flags do not engage in any activity that undermines the effectiveness of conservation. Many observers believe that the Agreement is weak and ineffective.
Rigaldies attacks the concept of self-defence which he considers to rely on the theory of necessity. In his opinion, the concept of self-defence is supported only by certain « anglo-saxon » authors. Rigaldies rejects selfdefence because it is related to the « effects » doctrine which would authorize a state to rule on infractions committed outside its territory but that have an injurious effect with the state's territory 93 .
Professor David VanderZwaag, of Dalhousie University Law Faculty, examined the « objective territoriality » or « effects principle » as a justification for the extension of enforcement measures by a coastal state which would include powers of arrest and prosecution of vessels fishing straddling stocks 94 .
VanderZwaag applied the « effects » principle to the straddling stock problem with the following rationale :
[...] that the conduct of foreign fishing on the high seas is having an effect on fish stocks within the national 200 nautical mile fishing zone or economic zone and on dependant coastal communities. Assuming that the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention grants coastal states the right unilaterally to make laws applicable to straddling stocks on the high seas where international negotiation fails, the « effects » principle would be a basis for applying national enforcement power to the adjacent high seas area as well 95 .
VanderZwaag admitted that the « effects » principle is not a sure foundation for extending enforcement jurisdiction over foreign fishing vessels on the high seas. He conceded, that even outside of the UNCLOS context, application has been controversial. Interestingly, Canada has not favoured the detrimental effects principle alone but has « intertwined » the approach with the nationality and protective principles 96 . Ted McDorman commented on VanderZwaag's «effects» principle and concluded it had been superseded by the provisions of the 1982 UNCLOS as well as its 1958 predecessors which explicitly permitted the freedom of fishing on the high seas and recognized the exclusive jurisdiction of flag states on the high seas:
It is my opinion that the international law of the sea exists as a complete code regarding high seas fishing activities, such that State jurisdiction has to be based on the foundation of the law of the sea rather than the more general foundation of the « effects » or protective doctrine 97 .
Conclusion
When you're weak on facts, argue the law. When you're weak on the law, argue the facts. When you 're weak on both the law and the facts, you attack the prosecution.
Old adage
The « necessity » principle is no longer applicable at the present time because of the development of international law. There are at least two past examples where necessity was used and later confirmed by international law recognition. In 1967, the United Kingdom relied on the necessity principle when it bombed a Liberian oil tanker Torrey Canyon in international law waters to prevent further pollution of the British coast. This action was taken after the British Government had failed to disperse the oil by using detergents on the surface of the sea. An attempt was made to salvage the vessel, however, the hull broke and more oil was released. The bombing was successful because it ignited and burned off the oil before it could spread.
There are several elements that should be remembered with the Torrey Canyon incident : the British authorities did not claim any legal justification for the bombing of the ship and in public statements, it emphasized the danger was extreme and the decision to bomb was made only after all other methods had failed. It was generally accepted a state of necessity existed because the flag state nor the shipowner protested the action 98 . The International Law Commission commented on the « Torrey Canyon » incident and concluded a state of necessity can be invoked as a basis for state conduct not in conformity with international obligations : [.. .] where such conduct proves necessary, by way of exception, in order to avert a serious and imminent danger which, even if not inevitable, is nevertheless a threat to a vital ecological interest, whether such conduct is adopted on the high seas, in outer space or-even this is not ruled out -in an area subject to the sovereignty of another state".
The actions taken during the «Torrey Canyon » incident received further recognition in UNCLOS Article 221 : Nothing [...] shall prejudice the right of States, pursuant to international law, both conventional and customary, to take and enforce measures beyond the territorial sea proportionate to the actual orthreatened damage to protect their coastline or related interests, including fishing, from pollution or threat of pollution following upon a maritime casualty.
A second recent example where the doctrine of necessity was used and later recognized was Canada's Arciic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 100 . Enacted in 1970, the legislation established a pollution prevention zone to a distance 100 miles from the coast of Canada. It enabled Canada to protect the Arctic marine environment without recourse to full-scale claim to sovereignty over the waters' 01 .
Ivan Head and Pierre Trudeau explained their legal justification regarding the Arciic Waters Pollution Prevention Act in their book The Canadian Way : Shaping Canadass Foreign Policy :
We would emphasize we were not acting in breach of international law, rather, in the special Arctic circumstances, we were acting on behalf of the international community in the absence of applicable law There are some critics who believe these unilateral attempts at functional jurisdiction are part of a larger diplomatic effort to set the agenda in multilateral forums. They consider the 1994 amendment to Coastal Fisheries Protection Act and the arrest of the Kristina Logos as a manoeuvre to further the Canadian agenda at the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks :
[...] la loi canadienne semble avoir pour double fonction d'encourager l'accélération des travaux de la Conférence sur les stocks chevauchants en même temps qu'elle marque la détermination du Canada à contrecarrer la surpêche étrangère au large de ses côtes 103 .
There are also some observers who believe that the arrest of the Estai was part of a Canadian negotiating strategy at the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Canadian Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin said Canada's seizure of the Spanish vessel convinced the EU countries that they should accept the final draft of the convention 104 .
Distinctions should be made between the application of enforcement measures against vessels flying flags of convenience and vessels that are under the responsibility of flag states such as Spain and Portugal. An argument can be made regarding the arrest of flag of convenience vessels which sail under the flag of more than one state in contravention of UNCLOS Article 92.1.
It is a very different argument to seize the vessels of another flag state such as Spain and Portugal. Even if the Canadian government could convince the international community that the seven conditions of necessity were present in the arrest of the Estai, it would have to convince them that the defence of necessity allows the use of force.
Yves Le Bouthillier observed that the International Law Commission was unable to resolve this issue and the United Nations Charter would therefore apply :
According to many people^the UN Charter allows resort to force in only two cases : self-defence, and actions under the authority of the Security Council. Even if we concede for argument's sake that necessity constitutes another exception permitting force, a state would have a hard time establishing that force was the only means open to it, given the clear obligation of states to resolve their disputes peacefully The obligation of states to resolve disputes peacefully could be considered analogous to the third condition of necessity -« the action taken by the state is only one that could safeguard its essential interest. » There remains some doubt that all avenues of negotiation and dispute settlement were considered before the arrest of the Spanish vessel.
Despite the precedents of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and the Torrey Canyon incident there seems to be a clear distinction between the arrest of foreign nationals on the high seas and the introduction of standards for tanker traffic in the Arctic or the destruction of a vessel and its potentially dangerous cargo after the failure of a salvage attempt. This distinction will never be decided upon by the International Court of Justice, because when Canada amended the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act it made a reservation regarding its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice 106 .
Furthermore, there remains the question whether Canada, the state relying on doctrine of necessity, has not contributed to that state of necessity. Yves Le Bouthillier remarked that «[t]he ILC [International Law Commission] seems to say that all contributions of a state, whether intentional or negligent, to a situation of necessity prevent it from invoking that defence 107 . » It could be argued that Canada contributed to creating a state of necessity by provoking a vote on the NAFO allocation that it knew would not be acceptable to the EU during the February 1, 1995, NAFO meeting in Brussels. Moreover, the EU asked the Chairman for the exceptional measure of having a vote on whether to vote on the allocations. A narrow vote, 6 to 5 with two abstentions, decided the quotas. Finally, it should be emphasized, the Canadian Fisheries Minister insisted on the term « transitional measures » which the EU considered would be equivalent to tacit acceptance of the Brussels meeting's allocations which would be used as an « allocation key » in the determination of future quotas 108 .
106. Currently, Spain is challenging the legality of the Canadian reservation to the International Court of Justice.
107. Y. LE BOUTHILLIER, loc. cit., note 76, A-29.
108. Interview with F. KINGSTON, supra, note 53 ; NAFO, op. cit., note 51, pp. 14-16. It could also be argued that Canada contributed to a state of necessity because of its own fishing activities within the 200-mile zone.
The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
The Road to the Rio Summit
There's a riddle now that might baffle all the lawyers backed by the ghosts of the whole line of judges: -like a hawk's beak it pecks my brain.
I'll, I'll solve it though !
Captain Ahab, in Moby Dick.
In 1990, Canada launched what it called the « legal initiative » to combat Canadian frustration with the existing UNCLOS framework. The initiative involved consultation with like-minded countries, the publication of legal and scientific articles, and the organization of conferences' 09 . In September, 1990, a conference was held in St.John's, Newfoundland, regarding the conservation and management of biological resources on the high seas. Legal and scientific experts from 16 countries discussed the problem of straddling stocks in the context of the Law of the Sea 110 .
The experts agreed on four principles : 1) distant water fishing states should cooperate with coastal states ; 2) members of regional fishing organizations have the duty to ensure their vessels respect conservation measures and do not « reflag » ; 3) distant water fishing states should ensure their fishing activities do not endanger stocks within the coastal state's competence ; and 4) the « consistency rule » : the management regime for high seas straddling stocks should be coordinated with measures adopted for stocks within the coastal states EEZs. The last two principles were not adopted unanimously because it raised the controversial issue of coastal state sovereignty over the management of fish stocks within the EEZ ' ' '.
The next instrumental conference was in Santiago, Chile, in May, 1991. Experts from Canada, Chile, and New Zealand recommended a series of measures that were inspired by the conclusions of the St.John's conference. This became known as the Santiago text, which emphasized the coastal state's special interest, coordination of conservation measures between the high seas fishing states and coastal states, and protection from the negative impact caused by high seas fishing activities on resources within the EEZ" 2 . The Santiago text influenced a proposal presented by 13 states, which included Canada, three months later, during the third session of the PrepCom for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)" 3 . The PrepComs were involved in the preparations for UNCED, otherwise known as « The Earth Summit », planned for June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The 1991 Proposal of 13 states emphasized the conservation problems caused by the lack of effective implementation of UNCLOS Articles 63 (2), 116 and 117. They proposed nine measures which included the «consistency rule 114 ».
In March to April, 1992, during the fourth and final session of the UNCED PrepCom, the 13 states werejoined by 27 developing countries and resubmitted a revised version of the 13 state proposal which also emphasized the consistency principle 115 . These 40 states co-sponsored document that became known as L. On the basis on the UNCED recommendation, the 47th session of the UN General Assembly adopted, December 22, 1992, resolution 47/192 which officially convened the conference 118 . 
Conservation and Management of Living Resources of the High Seas-Principles and
The Organizational Session : April 1993
The organizational session for the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was held at the UN headquarters in New York, April 19-23, 1993 " 9 . Ambassador Satya N. Nandan (Fiji), the former UN Under-Secretary-General and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Law of the Sea, was elected Chairman of the conference. The Chairman was requested to draft a document to address the issues to be discussed and to call for submissions from delegates. The first substantive session was significant because two divergent positions became clear : coastal states' rights and the interests of distant water fishing nations. Perhaps the most controversial issue was that of the management of a fish stock as one biological mass versus the division of a fish stock along political/territorial boundaries. This raised the issue of sovereignty, the EEZs of coastal states and the question of interference in the domestic management of fish stocks by distant water fishing nations. Some coastal states argued that any reference to EEZs should be eliminated from the negotiating text 121 .
A second controversial issue was discussed regarding flag state responsibilities for vessels on the high seas as well as those of coastal states, port states, and regional organizations. As the result of the debate on flagging or reflagging fishing vessels a consensus document was produced under the framework of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) : the « Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas 122 ».
A third issue was the precautionary approach debate. The EU, Japan, and Korea argued that the precautionary approach is taken directly from the Rio Declaration's Principle, which applies to pollution, and does not apply to fisheries management 123 .
The Second Substantive Session : March 1994
The second substantive was held in New York, March 14-31,1994. This session consisted primarily of reviewing and revising the negotiating in informal sessions. Interestingly, some « Core Group » coastal states (which expanded during the third session to include Peru and Norway) proposed to adopted unilateral measures to control high seas fishing if agreement could not be reached regarding an acceptable regime 124 .
Canadian Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin outlined four objectives that a new convention should recognize : the need for a precautionary approach, binding and compulsory dispute settlement mechanisms, compliance regarding conservation measures, and the special interests of coastal states. The response from Japan was that the present process should not include any new concepts or rights that go beyond the provisions of UNCLOS. Japan was not in favour of the precautionary approach because it could lead 121 to moratoria, and consequently limit the efforts of the Japanese longdistance fleet 125 .
The United States supported the ecosystem approach to maintain associated species, the precautionary approach, the need for regional cooperation, and assistance to the developing countries. Interestingly, the EU representative emphasized the importance of regional fisheries organizations and that the multilateral approach is irreplaceable. The EU interest in the preserving the multilateral status quo could have been their reluctance to be bound by an international convention whereas, currently, in NAFO they have the option of invoking the objection procedure 126 .
Informal sessions were held during the first week which discussed the question of coastal state sovereignty versus the freedom to fish on the high seas. The resulting debate involved the distant water states which argued for the biological unity of fish stocks whereas coastal states regarded this concept as intrusion on their sovereign rights and invasion of their EEZs 127 .
The Third Substantive Session : August 15-26,1994
After the Chairman's opening remarks, informal sessions were convened to discuss the Revised Negotiation Text (A/CONF.164/13/Rev.l). After some discussion, the Chairman produced a new draft of the negotiating text, which was in the form of a legally-binding draft agreement (the « Draft Agreement») 128 . 129 . This new draft agreement included a 31-page revised negotiating text with 47 articles in thirteen parts. Chairman Nandan stated that with further improvements the draft agreement would respond to the concerns of the Rio Declaration and Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 because it included several important proposals. First, there were several effective mechanisms suggested for compliance and enforcement of those measures on the high seas. Second, it provided for a globally-agreed framework for regional cooperation in fisheries conservation. Third, it recognized the need for the settlement of disputes relating to fisheries matters through compulsory binding dispute settlement 130 .
The Fourth Substantive Session : March 27-April 12,1995
The fourth substantive session was marked by the Canadian arrest of the Spanish fishing vessel Estai on March 9, 1995. Canadian Fisheries Minister Brian Tobin emphasized the need for five objectives to be achieved : a legally binding UN Convention ; the implementation of a precautionary approach ; compatibility between conservation measures inside and outside 200 miles ; binding and compulsory dispute settlement resolution measures ; and high seas enforcement 13 '.
There remained two contentious articles : Article 14 dealing with high sea enclaves and Article 21 regarding compliance and enforcement. There were two intersessional meetings : a June meeting in Washington and « presession» consultation in New York from 19-21 July, 1995. At the Washington meeting, hosted by the American government, various coastal state and distant water countries, including Argentina, Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, and Korea, discussed the compliance and enforcement issue under Article 21. The New York « pre-session » consultations held at UN Headquarters was attended by approximately 20 delegations. The discussion focused on the circulation of a « non-paper » prepared by the American delegation. The European Union and Japan presented two alternative texts.
The American non-paper became to be considered a « catalyst in attempting to seek a middle ground position' 32 ».
In conclusion, despite the inter-sessional discussions there remained difficulty in the final wording of Article 14 and Article 21 of the Chairman's Draft Agreement which continued into the fifth and final substantive session.
The Successful Conclusion : The Fifth Substantive Session
The ultimate success of the negotiations culminated in a final text of the Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. On August 4, 1995, Chairman Nandan outlined three essential « pillars » of the Agreement. The first pillar requires management be based on the precautionary approach. The second pillar ensures that the primary enforcement responsibility of the flag State is reaffirmed and the framework for action by States other than the flag States is set out with clear safeguards against abuse. The third pillar provides for the possibility of non-binding settlement, nevertheless, every dispute can be submitted to a tribunal for a binding decision 133 .
Pillar I : Conservation Measures
The Precautionary Approach
Article 5 (b) reemphasizes the principle that measures are based on the best scientific evidence available to determine the level of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) which is already contained in UNCLOS Article 119. Article 5 (c) mentions the application of the precautionary in accordance with Article 6.
It is important to remember when UNCLOS was adopted there was no precautionary approach included. Moritaka Hayashi, Director of the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, believes that the precautionary approach principle was developed since the mid-1980s in 132 domestic and regional legal instruments for the protection of the terrestrial and subsequently marine environment 134 .
Therefore, Article 6.2 is significant because «States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures 135 » (emphasis added).
Article 6.3 (b) and Annex II establish the guidelines to determine the precautionary approach reference points. The guidelines recommend the use of two types of « precautionary » reference points : conservation (or limit) reference points and management (or target) reference points. Conservation reference points set boundaries which are intended to constrain harvesting within safe biological limits within which the stocks can produce maximum sustainable yield, while management reference points are intended to meet management objectives. Article 6.4 requires that when reference points are approached they will not be exceeded and in the event that they are exceeded, States shall take action immediately. These reference points would seem to clarify the «F.O.I » versus «Fmax» debate within the NAFO organization 136 .
Compatibility between Conservation Measures
The Agreement is also significant because it attempts to resolve the issue of compatibility of conservation and management measures adopted for areas under national coastal state jurisdiction and those adopted for the high seas. Article 7 provisions are more specific than UNCLOS Article 63 (2) which requires coastal and high seas states fishing straddling stocks to « seek to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of the stock 137 ».
Moritaka Hayashi considered compatibility a difficult issue during the negotiations for the Agreement and « at the heart » of the issue was the 134 The theory of coastal state superiority could be challenged, however, by the curious juxtaposition of Article 7.2 (a) vis-à-vis Articles 7.2 (d) and 7.2 (e). Article 7.2 (d) takes into account biological unity including the extent to which the stocks occur and are fished in areas under national jurisdiction. Article 7.2 (e) takes into account the « respective dependence » of the coastal States and the States fishing on the high seas of the stocks concerned.
Pillar II : Effective Enforcement
Regional Fisheries Organizations
As mentioned in preceding pages, UNCLOS Article 63 (2) only required states to « seek to agree » for compatibilitay and NAFO sought to have « consistency » of conservation measures. There can be no doubt in the obligatory nature of regional fishery organization according to the requirements of Article 8.4 : «Only those States which are members of such an organization [...] or which agree to apply the conservation and management measures establish by such an organization [...] shall have access to the fishery resource to which those measures apply. »
Duties of Flag States
The Agreement has a number of obligations that the flag state must agree to before its vessels are allowed to fish in a regulatory area. Hitherto, UNCLOS Article 117 only required in a general manner : «All states have the duty to take, or cooperate with other States in taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. »
The new Agreement emphasizes the effective control of vessels from the flag state by various requirements as listed under 18 (3): control by means of fishing licenses that are in accordance with the flag state obligations to the regional fishing organization, the establishment of a national record of authorized fishing vessels, and timely reporting of vessel position and fish catches.
Also included in Article 18 provisions are measures for monitoring and surveillance, such as the implementation of observer programs and satellite surveillance, which were part of the recent bilateral agreement between Canada and the European Union (later extended to all NAFO members). Articles 19 and 20 require compliance and enforcement measures by the flag state.
Port State Jurisdiction
UNCLOS Article 218 empowers Port States to undertake investigations and where evidence so warrants, institute proceedings if the vessel is voluntarily within a port. Article of 23 (2) of the Agreement allows the port state to inspect documents, fishing gear, and catch on board the vessel. Article 23 (3) gives new powers to port states «to prohibit landings and transhipments where it has been established that the catch has been taken whether or not the parties to the Agreement are also parties to UNCLOS (Article 30 (1)). Therefore, these provisions would apply to any dispute between state parties «concerning the interpretation or application of a subregional, regional or global fisheries agreement relating to straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks to which they are parties, including any dispute concerning the conservation and management of such stocks, » whether or not they are also parties to UNCLOS (Article 30 (2)) 144 .
A Canadian newspaper, The Globe and Mail, considers the new dispute settlement mechanism as a means of preventing unilateral quotas within NAFO:
In the past, when NAFO assigned quotas, members who disagreed could opt out and set their own limits. Now quotas must be consistent with the policy set by the coastal state which shares the stock, and if one member tries to undermine that decision with its own quota, the dispute can be taken to an independent tribunal set up under the UN's Convention on the Law of the Sea 145 .
Conclusion
Canada has a mytholog,, but it is only now, after about 400 years of history, being forced to decide what it is going to do about it
Robertson DAVIES Canada has a certain international myth of multilateralism and quiet diplomacy to preserve. Are Canada's recent unilateral actions a betrayal of the multilateral tradition ? Some observers recall the aggressive unilateral Canadian action during the enactment of the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. Other observers, such as Professor Ted McDorman, commented that these memories are of alleged aggressive Canadian action to protect its Arctic interests in the 1970s 147 .
Other commentators, such as Professor Michael M'Gonigle, questioned Canada's motives during the United Nations Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Conference. M'Gonigle observed: « Despite its conservationist posturing, no one is sure on whose side Canada will stand 148 . » The concern over Canada's position during the Conference related to its reluctance to embrace the « consistency rule ».
The consistency rule is important to the application of the precautionary approach of fisheries management. The rule requires that both coastal states and high seas fishing states abide by the same approach. Some coastal states, however, believe that the imposition of the consistency rule infringes upon their sovereignty. Canada was criticized because it was perceived to have diluted its support for the consistent application of the precautionary approach. Canada had not changed its position, however, it had become less vocal because another member of the so-called Core group, Chile, had reservations regarding the effects of the consistency rule to Chile's sovereignty 149 .
To judge the success of the Canadian government's two-track strategy, the unilateral and multilateral approaches, a careful examination of the two resulting agreements is required. The major accomplishment of the Canada-EU Bilateral Agreement (later made multilateral to apply to all NAFO members) was the establishment of the observer program with 100 % coverage on all NAFO member fishing vessels. The program does not apply to the non-NAFO member countries, stateless vessels, nor flag of convenience vessels 150 .
The United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly, Migratory Fish Stocks suggests the implementation of observer programs (Article 18). Furthermore, it has provisions that can apply to flag of convenience vessels : Article 21(1) allows a contracting party to the Agreement, which is a member of a regional fisheries organization, the right to board and inspect fishing vessels of another contracting party even if such a party is not a membrr of the regional organization. of national jurisdiction and the high seas to straddling and highly migratory stocks (Articles 3 (1), 5 (c) and 6). The controversial NAFO objection procedure still remains a challenge to NAFO decisions. The UN Agreement's Article 30 (2) emphasizes the UNCLOS dispute settlement provisions can be applied by parties to the Agreement to disputes concerning the application and interpretation of a regional fisheries organization's agreement, to which they are members, whether or not these states are also parties to UNCLOS 151 .
Canada has always been aware of the necessity of careful coordination between aggressive unilateral action and multilateral negotiation. Ted McDorman remarked that the dilemma was whether Canada's aggressive actions had improved the climate for international agreements 152 . The twotrack strategy is often compared to the strategy outlined during the enactment of the 1970 Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The strategy relies on the belief that existing international law can be developed by what may be considered unilateral and illegal action.
McDorman believes the enactment of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act is not a good analogy because Canada's aggression was alleged, in fact, no country's direct interests were challenged 153 . Many Canadians also seemed to have forgotten that while Canada continued to work on the drafting of regulations for the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, it was also engaged in widespread consultation with interested countries 154 .
Therefore, instead of trying to excuse Canadian unilateral action by justifications under UNCLOS or the concept of necessity, the Canadian government should have emphasized that it was acting in the development of international law in consultation with other countries. In 1970, Pierre Trudeau articulated these elements :
We have told our friends and neighbours that the Canadian step, designed to protect Arctic waters, will not lead to anarchy ; it is not a step which diminishes the international rule of law ; it is not a step taken in disregard of the aspirations and interests of other members of the international community. Canadian action is instead an assertion of the importance of the environment 155 .
151. The EU has given its intention to become a party to the UN Agreement pending EU internal procedures. 
